Many data analysis applications rely on social networks that contain abundant information about individuals. Nevertheless, these applications can leak private information about individuals in social networks. To protect the privacy of individuals in social networks, several approaches involving graph generation models or differential privacy were proposed for publishing a social network in place of the original graph for data analysis applications. However, these techniques can cause a serious loss of data utility, especially regarding the real social links. In this paper, we propose an approach of degree-differential privacy graph generation with field theory. The approach includes two steps for publishing a social network. The degrees of the nodes are first perturbed with the differential privacy by adding noise that follows a Laplacian distribution. Then, the edges of the social network are synthesized with field theory. We propose a field theory model for social networks by simulating the law of gravity in physics and establish the correspondence of the gravitational field in physics to the field theory model. When an edge is formed, the starting node is preferentially chosen with high probability from the nodes with high degrees, and then the ending node is selected with high probability when the interaction force between the starting node and the ending node is large. Extensive experiments over four datasets show that our approach can preserve more real social ties compared with previous approaches and will not incur a loss of structure features over the datasets, such as the degree distribution and clustering coefficients.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the internet and wireless communication technology, especially with the popularity of mobile intelligent devices, social networks have become indispensable parts of our daily lives and have greatly changed the connection of individuals. An ever-increasing number of researchers who focus on data mining, sociology, and other aspects analyze social networks to discover the network topology, evolution process, user classification, behavioral tendency, and so on. However, releasing a social network containing private information about individuals would lead to a serious disclosure of personal privacy. Therefore, preserving the privacy of individuals has introduced new challenges for releasing social networks [1] .
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Usually, a social network is modeled as a graph, in which each node represents an individual or a user and each edge refers to a social link between individuals. Each node may have attributes for an individual. There are many schemes on privacy-preserving data publication for social networks, including K-anonymization and its derived approaches [2] - [6] , randomization [7] , and generalization [8] , [9] . However, K-anonymization and its derived methods would change the structure of original social networks, and then the data utility of the social network would not be preserved. For the randomization methods, the features of an anonymized social network (such as the degree distribution and clustering coefficients) vary with the randomization process over the original data; consequently, the data utility of a published social network could not be preserved steadily because of the randomization. In generalization methods, the nodes and edges are divided into groups, and only the numbers of nodes and edges in the groups are released. However, the released data are not conducive to an analysis of the local structure of social networks. Thus, the data utility of a published social network is reduced.
Subsequently, differential privacy approaches have been applied to preserve privacy for social networks. There are two classifications: (1) differential privacy for the specific statistical information over social networks, such as the degree distribution of nodes [10] , [11] , subgraph count query [12] - [14] , and frequent subgraph mining [15] , and (2) release of graph data with differential privacy offline [11] , [16] - [24] , [44] , [45] . The graph generation models in the literature [11] , [16] - [22] , [44] , [45] for releasing graph data offline shuffle the real social links randomly and reduce the community features of graphs in the published social networks. Therefore, the community features are not capable of being discovered from the anonymized synthetic graphs. Although in most social networks, the community features are sparse globally and dense locally, these properties are ignored. In addition, the social networks are randomly perturbed. Then, the data utility cannot be preserved. Moreover, when we release an anonymized social network with attributes, if the released data do not retain the correct social links as much as possible, then it becomes difficult to accurately analyze the contributions of different attributes when a published social network is analyzed. Specifically, the utility of the published social network is also reduced.
Before a social network is published offline, the social network is anonymized. However, the nodes, edges, and structure of the social network graph can be obtained from the published social network. Since most social networks follow a power-law distribution, the number of nodes with high degrees is small. The probability of identifying a node with a high degree is relatively high. Thus, in an anonymized social network, the nodes with high degrees could be de-anonymized by attackers by associating the identification of a real user with an anonymous user. Moreover, after several users are identified, the users could become the background knowledge of the attackers to further infer the identifications of other users, which would cause a serious privacy disclosure. Obviously, the nodes and edges are closely related in a published social network, and only protecting nodes or edges cannot guarantee the security of the social network. Although the concepts of node-differential privacy and edge-differential privacy have been proposed in the literature [10] , [28] , only the degree distribution of nodes is published in these works [10] , [20] , [28] , [49] . Unfortunately, generating a social network graph offline has not been illustrated in these studies.
In this work, we propose an approach of degree-differential privacy graph generation with field theory for social network data publishing. The approach includes two steps for synthesizing a social network. First, we present the concept of degree-differential privacy and perturb the degrees of all nodes in a social network. Next, the edges of the graph are synthesized with field theory. We propose a field theory model for social networks, where a social network is regarded as a mechanical system in a virtual space, with physical properties such as mass for a node and distance between nodes. We consider the degree of a node as the mass because the degree of a node indicates the influence of a user across the social network. In addition, while calculating the interaction force, we regard the correlation between nodes as the distance. When an edge is formed, the starting node is preferentially chosen with high probability from the nodes with high degrees; then, the ending node is selected with high probability when the interaction force between the starting node and the ending node is relatively large. With this approach, the features over the social network are preserved in an anonymous graph. In addition, more real social links can also be retained. Thus, data usability can be improved. Regarding security, after the degrees of the nodes in the social network are perturbed by the degree-differential privacy, the number of neighbors for a node may increase or decrease, and the edges between nodes may be true or false. Therefore, even if a node in the anonymized social network is identified, the attacker is unable to further identify other nodes. Consequently, the privacy of the published social network can be protected. The main contributions of our approach are summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the concept of degree-differential privacy. Then, two steps for synthesizing a social network are presented. The degrees of nodes are first perturbed by the degree-differential privacy, then a graph generation method with field theory is presented when the edges of the social network are synthesized.
(2) We propose a field theory model for social networks by simulating the law of gravity in physics and use the field theory model to generate edges.
(3) We evaluate the data utility of our degree-differential privacy graph generation approach with field theory (DP-FT) over four real datasets and compare our method with previous works. The results show that under the same privacy level, our approach can preserve more real social ties and does not lose the features of the datasets, such as the degree distribution, and clustering coefficients.
In the next section, we present the concept of degree-differential privacy. In Section III, we propose the field theory model for a social network. In Section IV, we illustrate the approach of the degree-differential privacy graph generation with field theory. In Section V, we illustrate our experimental results on four real-world datasets and provide an analysis of the results. In Section VI, we offer a brief overview of related works. Section VII presents the conclusion.
II. DEGREE-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, the notations for a graph in this paper are listed. In addition, the concept of degree-differential privacy and a related theorem are introduced.
A social network is usually formalized as an undirected graph that is denoted by
is a set of nodes, where each node represents an individual or a user in G. E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n } is a set of edges, where e ij refers to a social link between v i and v j . |V | and |E| denote the numbers of nodes and edges in G, respectively. (v i ) denotes the set of neighbor nodes of v i , i.e., (v 
An important concept in this paper is the notion of differential privacy. Differential privacy is a rigorous and robust protection model that can guarantee that the released data will not reveal their participants. The basic idea is that noise is added to the original data or the statistical results to protect privacy. Differential privacy is based on the concept of neighboring datasets that differ on one record. Suppose D and D are neighboring datasets; then, we have the following definition of differential privacy.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [25] ): A randomized algorithm M satisfies differential privacy if for any given dataset D and its neighboring datasets D and for any possible
, where the Pr[·] denotes the probability of an event and the parameter is the privacy budget, which controls the probability that the algorithm M obtains the same output over the two neighboring datasets.
In Definition 1, the range of is [0, ∞). When the value of is 0, the value of
This indicates that users cannot distinguish whether they access to D or to the neighboring dataset D to obtain the same results, and thus, the randomized algorithm M is secure. In contrast, if the value of is large, datasets D and D are distinguishable, and the randomized algorithm M is not secure enough.
For a social network, the degree of a node is the number of edges linking to the node. If an attacker knows the degree distribution in a social network, the attacker can almost infer the structure of the social network accurately. Since the degree distribution in a social network follows the power-law distribution, the nodes with high degrees would reveal the privacy of individuals. If we change the degrees of nodes, the degrees for all nodes would be protected. Therefore, we introduce the definition of degree-differential privacy in the following.
Definition 2 (Degree-Differential Privacy): For a social network G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ), if the degree of a node in G 1 decreases by only 1 (or increases by only 1), we obtain a social network
For a privacy protection mechanism A, suppose Range(A) is the scope of output of A; if an arbitrary output O(O ⊆ Range(A)) for A over G 1 and G 2 satisfies the definition of differential privacy Pr[A(G 1 ) = O] ≤ e Pr[A(G 2 ) = O], then we can assert that A satisfies degree-differential privacy.
In a social network, we pay more attention to the links between the individuals. Therefore, when differential privacy is enhanced directly in social networks, we change the concept of a neighboring dataset in degree-differential privacy slightly. Degree-differential privacy protects the relationship between individuals and can diminish the distinctive signature of a high-degree node.
Noise Mechanism: Two common techniques, the Laplacian mechanism [26] and the exponential mechanism [27] , have been proposed to implement differential privacy. Generally, the Laplacian mechanism is used for perturbing numerical data, while the exponential mechanism is used for perturbing discrete data. Therefore, in this paper, the Laplacian mechanism is used to perturb the degrees of nodes.
Theorem 1 [26] : For any function f : D → R d and algorithm M , the input is a dataset D, and the output is a d-dimensional vector R d (R is a set of real numbers). If the output M (D) satisfies:
then the algorithm M satisfies the differential privacy of the Laplacian mechanism,
is an independent Laplacian variable that follows the Laplacian distribution with the scale of f / .
In Theorem 1, the f is the global sensitivity. To satisfy the requirements of differential privacy, the noise in the Laplacian mechanism is closely related to the global sensitivity. The global sensitivity refers to the maximum change for the results of the function f that arises from the neighboring datasets. In the following, we will define global sensitivity.
Definition 3 (Global Sensitivity [26] ): For any function f : D → R d , the input is a dataset D and the output is a d-dimensional vector R d . For any neighboring datasets D and 1 , denotes that for any pair of datasets D and D , where D is any neighboring dataset of D, we calculate the maximum difference for the results of the f on D and D , and the maximum difference is the global sensitivity. The function f is any access or calculation function over a dataset D; for example, f can be a query or a statistical function. When the global sensitivity is larger, more noise needs to be added to preserve privacy, which would result in poor data availability.
From Definition 3, we have following theorem for degree-differential privacy.
Theorem 2: Suppose a function f : f (G) → S exists, where S is the degree sequence of a social network G: d i (i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |). If the results A(G) of an algorithm A satisfy the following formula (1):
then A is the degree-differential privacy that satisfies the Laplacian mechanism, where Lap i ( f )(1 ≤ i ≤ |V |) is an independent Laplacian variable following the Laplacian distribution with parameter f . f is the global sensitivity of f . Proof: From Definition 1 and Definition 2, suppose G 2 is a neighboring dataset of a social network G 1 . To ensure the privacy protection mechanism A satisfies degree-differential privacy, the formula Pr
should be true. In the following, we will prove the conclusion.
We can add noise following a Laplacian distribution into G 1 and G 2 ; then, we obtain the following equation (2):
where f (G 1 ) and f (G 2 ) are values returned from function f . The probability Pr[·] of an output O for A depends on
and Lap i ( f / ) is the noise following a Laplacian distribution. According to formula (1), formula (2) is equal to:
The probability density function for a Laplacian distribu-
The O in formula (3) corresponds to x in the probability density function, f (G 1 ) and f (G 2 ) correspond to µ, and f / corresponds to b. According to the probability density function for a Laplacian distribution and the independence of degree-differential privacy over nodes, formula (3) can be converted to:
According to the triangle inequality, formula (4)
From Definition 3, the global sensitivity f = max G 1 ,G 2 f (G 1 )−f (G 2 ) 1 , and formula (4) can be converted to ≤ exp( ).
Therefore,
Then, A satisfies degree-differential privacy.
III. THE FIELD THEORY MODEL FOR A SOCIAL NETWORK
After the degrees of nodes are perturbed by degree-differential privacy, the edges should be regenerated to form a new social network. In our work, we will synthesize the edges in the social network with field theory. In this section, we will model a social field after we analyze the similarity between social networks and the gravitational field. Then, we will illustrate how to calculate the mass of a node (or a user), the distance r, and the force between two nodes.
A. MODELING A SOCIAL FIELD FOR A SOCIAL NETWORK
In physics, a field is a distribution of a physical quantity in space. Classical field theory describes the gravitational force F as an interaction force between two entities. An entity with mass M a is associated with a gravitational force F that influences the other object with mass M b . F is given by
where K is a coefficient and r is the distance between the two objects.
A social network is a system that consists of individuals and social ties. In the literature [29] for the formation of social networks, nodes in a social network have features of popularity and homogeneity. Popularity refers to the notion that high-degree nodes attract additional other nodes to create new social links. Homogeneity means that interconnected individuals tend to be similar. In particular, the correlation between individuals affects creating a link between them. Considering the similar features between social networks and gravitational fields, we mimic the gravitational field to model a social field to describe the impact of popularity and homogeneity on generating social links. We consider the degree of a node as the mass of the node, and the correlation between two nodes as the distance while calculating the interaction force. The probability of forming a social link between two individuals depends on their interaction force. Therefore, we obtain a field theory model for a social network. In the following, we will describe how to calculate the mass M of a user, the distance between nodes, and the interaction force between users in a social network.
B. THE MASS OF A USER IN A SOCIAL NETWORK
As the gravitational field corresponds to a social network, the mass M for an object could be mapped to the degree of a node in a social network, i.e., M i = d i . In an undirected graph, the degree of v i can be regarded as the level of activity for v i , indicating whether the user v i is accomplished in making friends, or the degree of v i can be regarded as the popularity of v i , indicating whether the user v i is easily followed by other users. Therefore, the degree of a node represents the impact of a user across the social network, and we denote the impact M of a user as the degree of the node.
C. DISTANCE BETWEEN NODES
Intuitively, for any two nodes with a path between them, the correlation and distance are closely related. The shorter the distance between the two individuals is, the more intimate the connection between them is. We denote the correlation of a node v i and a node v j as NodeSim(i, j). The distance r between v i and v j in the gravitational force formula is inversely proportional to the NodeSim(i, j). Therefore, we have the following Equation (5) .
Currently, graphical topology is widely used for calculating the correlation between the nodes in data mining, recommendation systems, and other applications. According to the formation of a social network, the correlation VOLUME 7, 2019 between nodes has effects on creating a link between them. From Equation (5), the larger the correlation between two users (or two nodes) is, the higher the probability of forming an edge between the two users is. Then, the data utility can be preserved. After we select a start node v i , we should decide the set of nodes V i candicate from which the ending node v j would be chosen. All the nodes with a path from v i belong to V i candicate ; that is, all correlations between the nodes in V i candicate and v i are not equal to 0. Generally, the longer the length of a path is, the less the correlation between the node and v i is, but the lengths of paths decide the cardinality of V i candicate . Furthermore, if the degree of a node v k in a path between v i and v j is high, the attentiveness of v k to each of its neighbor is low. Then, the degree of v k would reduce the correlation between v i and v j . If there are many paths between v i and v j , although there is no direct edge between v i and v j , the correlation between the two nodes would be high. Therefore, when we calculate the correlation between nodes we should synthetically consider the following three factors of graphical topology in order to preserve data utility: (1) the length of a path between the two nodes, (2) the degrees of nodes through the paths between the two nodes, and (3) the number of paths between the two nodes.
Many approaches have been proposed to calculate the correlation between nodes in a graph [30] - [33] . In information retrieval, the page correlation is based on the random walk in Google's page rank [34] . In many recommendation systems, personalized sorting algorithms are based on the random walk, such as Personal rank [35] and Sim rank [36] . In addition to the three factors about the correlation mentioned in the last paragraph, the encounter times between two nodes in the process of a random walk is another factor. Compared with Jaccard [33] and Adamic-Adar [30] for local correlations, random walk (RW) [37] has the advantages of capturing the global structure of a social network and those factors. However, a real social network consists of millions of users, and the complexity of the global random walk [36] is extremely high. Furthermore, six degrees of separation theory shows that the distribution of a user's friends in the social network is localized, and any individual connects with another within six or fewer steps (one step encounters an individual). Thus, we calculate NodeSim(i, j) based on the local random walk (LRW) such that the steps for the random walk are at most 6.
The LRW is based on a Markov walk process. According to the Markov properties, in order to calculate the NodeSim(i, j), which is the result of the multistep random walk between node v i and v j , we should define the initial correlation s ij between v i and v j , and calculate the one-step transition probability p ij from s ij . Then, the sum of the results for a multistep random walk is the NodeSim(i, j).
The correlation between users in a real social network is not symmetrical; that is, the correlation of v i to v j is not equal to the relevance of v j to v i . The initial correlation of the user i and the user j in an undirected graph can be defined as follows:
Definition 4 (One-Step Transition Probability): The conditional probability p ij (n) = P{X n+1 = j|X n = i} is the one-step transition probability of internodes in a social network, where p ij (n) represents the probability that at time n, a transition will occur from the starting node v i to the ending node v j along the edge e ij .
LRW is based on a Markov walk process such that the transition probability
The property indicates that we can use s ij to obtain the state transition probability directly. In the following discussion, we will have p ij = s ij .
Definition 5 (n-Step Transition Probability): The conditional probability p
In Algorithm 1, the calculation of correlation between nodes based on the local random walk is described. The input parameters consist of a social network G and the steps t for a local random walk. Based on six-degree separation theory, t is no more than 6. The output is a correlation matrix denoted as SimMatrix. The TransMatrix is the state transition matrix of LRW that controls the random walk process, and TransMatrix is initialized as TransMatrix = [p ij ] |V |×|V | . In the first step, the correlation matrix is initialized as the one-step transition probability. Then, in the steps 2-5, the correlation matrix is updated continuously by the local random walk. Finally, the correlation between v i and v j is the total sum of the transition probability for the random walk from the first step to the t th step, i.e.,
ij is computed by Theorem 3, and finally we have NodeSim(i, j) = SimMatrix[i] [j] . In the subsequent calculation, we use 1 NodeSim(i,j) as the distance between the node v i and node v j .
Although LRW does not achieve global convergence, Algorithm 1 can reduce the computational complexity. Compared with the simple local random walk, LRW considers the results of multistep random walks. The random walk is repeated from a starting node so that the correlations between the starting node and its neighboring nodes or multihop nodes may be higher, which is consistent with the feature that a user in a social network has a higher probability to make friends with familiar individuals.
D. THE INTERACTION FORCE BETWEEN NODES IN A SOCIAL NETWORK
The probability of creating a link between v a and v b is proportional to the interaction force F between v a and v b . The smaller the distance between v a and v b is and the higher the 
degree of v b is, the larger the force generated by v a on v b is; thus, the higher the probability of creating a link from v a to v b is. According to the distance formula (5), we obtain the following formula (7) for the interaction force between nodes in an undirected graph:
Since the force has a common constant K in formula (7), we can remove K for the sake of convenience, and we obtain the following formula (8) .
where n is an adjustment factor. Generally, a larger value of n indicates that the distance between nodes provides a greater contribution than that of the node degree in forming a social tie; namely, the effect of homogeneity is greater than that of popularity.
Force Matrix M force : Accordingly, we can construct a force matrix M force to record the interaction force for any pairs of nodes in the social network, and we have M force = [F(i, j)] |V |×|V | , where F(i, j) refers to the interaction force on v j generated by v i .
IV. THE APPROACH OF DEGREE-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY GRAPH GENERATION WITH FIELD THEORY
In this section, we will first describe the two stages of our approach. Then, the mechanisms of forming an edge are introduced, and finally, we describe the algorithm for generating a synthetic graph.
A. TWO STAGES OF DEGREE-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY GRAPH GENERATION
According to Section II, before we publish a social network, we should first perturb the degrees of nodes by adding noise following a Laplacian distribution. Then, the structure of the social network is changed, and the edges need to be reconstructed. Finally, the published social network is a synthetic graph. Therefore, our method includes two stages. In the first stage, the degrees of nodes in a social network are perturbed by the degree-differential privacy; then, the degree distribution of nodes in the original social network is vague. In the second stage, the edges of the social network are reconstructed by the field theory model. A synthetic edge between nodes is formed with high probability when the interaction force between the nodes is relatively large. The real social links between nodes can be preserved during synthesizing the social networks. In addition, a randomization operation is added during the edge generation to fuzzify the neighbor subgraphs for nodes in the published social network. Although the attacker knows parts of the features of an individual, the user would not be identified in the published social network.
B. MECHANISMS FOR GENERATING AN EDGE
When an edge is generated, we should first select a starting node. We choose a high-degree node with high probability because the node with a high degree would have more contributions to form an edge. Choosing a node with a high degree is called the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node. After we select a starting node, we will choose an ending node. After the interaction forces between any two pairs of nodes are calculated, a node with a larger interaction force from the starting node is chosen with high probability because a user in a social network tends to link either to users with high correlations or to users with high degrees. Choosing an ending node with a high interaction force F from the starting node is called the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge. In the following, we will present the two mechanisms.
1) MECHANISM FOR PREFERENTIALLY SELECTING A NODE
In a social network G, we choose a starting node v i with probability
After choosing a starting node v i , a set of candidate nodes for v i :
According to the field theory model for a social network, the probability of selecting a node v j ∈ V i candidate is proportional to the interaction force F(i, j) from v i to v j . This process can be expressed by a conditional probability p(e ij |v i ).
2) MECHANISM FOR PREFERENTIALLY GENERATING AN EDGE
After a starting node v i is chosen by the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node, the probability p(e ij |v i ) for choosing an ending node v j to form the edge e ij is shown in Equation (9):
An ending node v j is chosen to form an edge according to the conditional probability p(e ij |v i ) until the degree of each VOLUME 7, 2019 node reaches the perturbed value. Generally, the number of edges is related to the amount of added noise after the degrees of nodes are perturbed in the first stage.
C. THE DEGREE-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY GRAPH GENERATION ALGORITHM WITH FIELD THEORY
In this section, we will describe the algorithm of generating a synthetic graph and analyze the complexity and security of the algorithm.
1) THE ALGORITHM OF GENERATION A SYNTHETIC GRAPH
According to the approach described in Section IV.A and IV.B, the algorithm for synthesizing an undirected graph is shown in Algorithm 2.
In the Algorithm 2, graph G, privacy budget , and steps t for the local random walk are input parameters. The output is a new set of edges E T because the set of nodes in the synthetic graph is the same as the set of the original graph G. In lines 1-3 in Algorithm 2, the interaction force matrix M force , set of edges E T , and queue are initialized. Moreover, to form a degree-sequence S for degrees of nodes in G, the actual degree of each node needs to be computed. In lines 4-7, the correlation between v i and v j is calculated by Algorithm 1. In lines 8-15, we initialize the set of candidates V i candidates for node v i by NodeSim(i, j) which is computed in Algorithm 1 and compute the forces between two nodes of the graph. In lines 17-22, we add independent noise Lap(2/ε) to degrees of nodes and obtain a noisy sequence S of node degrees. The main loop (lines 23 − 45) is the process of generating a set of edges based on the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge. In lines 46 − 57, when V i candidates is empty, several mendacious edges are added to reach the perturbed degree for node v i . According to the V i candidates , the distances for residual nodes to v i are infinite; generating an edge only considers the impact M of node v i (in line 50).
To explain the sampling step in line 25 in Algorithm 2, we provide the following Example 1. The process of the step in lines 28 and 50 is analogous. Example 1. We construct a roulette r based on the degrees of nodes. Suppose we have a social network with five nodes, A, B, C, D, and E; after the degrees of nodes are perturbed, the degrees of these nodes in a social network are 2, 3, 2, 1, and 1, respectively. We construct a circular array r [1..9] for which the length is 9. In r, the numbers of elements for A, B, C, D, and E are 2, 3, 2, 1, and 1 respectively. Let x be a random integer within 1 − 9; then, r[x] is the selected node. For the nodes, the higher the degree is, the higher the probability of being selected is. Although the degree of node B is the highest, node B is not selected every time.
In the steps that perturb a social network graph, there are two main factors that affect the data utility. The first is the differential privacy parameter . The decides the amount of noise to be added to the degrees of nodes, and then data utility is partly determined. The second is the method of generating edges, namely, the field theory model that affects the data utility by the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge. Although randomness is introduced in selecting a start node and generating an edge, it would not decide the trend of selecting a start node and generating an edge and have little impact on the data utility. As the amount of noise to be added is stochastic, the data utility would have a slight fluctuation, but the scale of the fluctuation is smaller.
2) COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Generating a synthetic graph consists of two important steps: adding noise for degree-differential privacy and generating a graph.
The time complexity of adding noise for degree-differential privacy is O(|V |), where |V | is the number of the nodes in G. Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 2 depends on the process of generating a graph.
In the process of generating a graph, the distances between nodes are calculated in Algorithm 1 in which paths are considered only within length t rather than the entire paths in the social network. For the starting node v i , in Algorithm 1, all friends of v i are traversed, and then the friends of each friend are also traversed and the process repeats until the lengths of the paths reach t.
Suppose the time complexity of traversing friends of a node is O(h) (h is the average degree(h = |E| |V | × 2) for nodes in a social network). As a social network graph is sparse, h is much smaller than |V |. Although the complexity for calculation of correlations for any pairs of two nodes is O(|V | × |V |), both the time and the space complexity of Algorithm 1 are O(|V | × h t ) by compressing the space of the matrix. Next, in Algorithm 2, in each iteration, it is necessary to calculate the probabilities of the selected pairs of candidate nodes, which corresponds to line 28. The average number of pairs of candidate nodes for a given v i does not exceed h t , so the complexity of sampling edges is O(|V |×h t ). Therefore, both the time and space complexity of generating a graph are O(|V | × h t ).
Ultimately, the time and space complexity of Algorithm 2 are both equal to O(|V | × h t ).
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
From the process of generating a synthetic graph, the degrees of nodes are perturbed and the degrees of nodes are not changed during generating a synthetic graph. Therefore, Algorithm 2 satisfies degree-differential privacy. We will analyze the security of Algorithm 2 in the following.
Theorem 4: The Algorithm 2 satisfies degree-differential privacy for an undirected graph.
Proof: Let G = (V , E) be an undirected graph as the input of Algorithm 2. Without loss of generality, suppose we generate a neighboring graph G by increasing or decreasing by one for the degree of an arbitrary node v i in G by adding or deleting an edge linked with the node v i ; then, the degree of a neighboring node v j of v i is also changed by one. Algorithm 2 DP-FT(G, , t) Input: G = (V , E) and privacy budget , steps t for random walk Output: Set of edges E T 1: Initialization: SimMatrix = 0; M force = 0; E T = φ; queue = φ; 2: V = {v 1 , · · · , v |V | }; // the set of nodes in G, 3: S =< d 1 , · · · , d |V | >;// the sequence of degrees in G 4: SimMatrix = DistanceCompute(G, t); 5: for each node pair v i , v j ∈ V do 6: NodeSim(i, j) = SimMatrix[i][j]; 7: end for 8: for each node v i ∈ V do 9 :
10:
if v i candidates = φ then 11: for ∀v v ∈ V i candidates do 12: Compute F(i, v) by formula (8) and save to M force (i, v) 13: end for 14: end if 15 : end for 16 : //add noise in the Laplacian distribution for degree-sequence S to obtain the perturbed degree-sequence S 17: if = 0 then 18: for each d i ∈ S do 19: d i ← min(|V |, max(1, d i + Lap(2/ ))); 20:
end for 22 : end if 23: while V = φ do 24: //Mechanism for preferentially selecting a node 25: Sample v i in V with the probability of if v i candidates = φ then 27: //Mechanism for preferentially generating an edge 28: Sample v j in V i candidate with the probability p(e ij |v i ) by formula (9); 29: Delete v j in V i candidate and delete v i in V j candidate 30: if e ij not ∈ E T then 31 :
end if 33: else 34: queue = queue {v i }; 35: end if 36: if d i = 0 then 37: Delete v i in V ; 38: end if 39: if d j = 0 then 40: Delete v j in V ; 41: end if 42: if (queue V ) = queue then 43: break 44: end if Algorithm 2 (Continued.) DP-FT(G, , t) 45 : end while 46: while queue is not empty do 47: select v i from queue 48: if V = NULL then 49: repeat 50: Sample v j in V with the probability Suppose S and S denote the degree sequences for G and G respectively. As the degrees of v i and v j in S are different from the degrees of v i and v j in S, the L 1 distance for S and S is |S − S | = 2. According to the concept of the neighboring dataset in Definition 2 and Definition 3, the global sensitivity for degree-differential privacy is 2. From Algorithm 2, generating noise following a Laplacian distribution is only related to the privacy budget in line 19. Although in line 25, the perturbed degrees of nodes are used in choosing the starting node, randomness is introduced in the step. Thus, this step would not leak information about the original degrees and thereby preserve privacy. Moreover, although there are several other parameters in Algorithm 2, these parameters would not influence the degree of any node in the subsequent process of synthesizing a graph. From Theorem 2, we have the conclusion that Algorithm 2 satisfied degree-differential privacy of the Laplacian mechanism.
Compared with node-differential privacy and edgedifferential privacy proposed in the literature [10] , [20] , [28] , [49] , although the approach of calculating and optimizing the degree distribution of nodes for edge-differential privacy is illustrated, generating an anonymized social network based on node-differential privacy or edge-differential privacy for publishing social networks offline is not described. Thus, the node-differential privacy and edge-differential privacy in the literature [10] , [20] , [28] , [49] cannot be directly used for publishing a social network offline. According to the node-differential privacy, when a node is added (or deleted) in a social network, the degrees of neighbors that connect to the added (or deleted) node would be increased (or decreased). Therefore, for the degree distribution, according to Definition 3, the global sensitivity is twice the maximum degree of all nodes in the graph. The global sensitivity is usually very large and would cause large noise to be added when node-differential privacy is enforced [10] , [49] . Although a graph projection method is proposed to restrict the maximum degree of a node to the threshold θ in literature [28] , the sensitivity is 2θ +1 for publishing the degree histogram. The sensitivity is still large for differential privacy. Therefore, it is difficult for the node-differential privacy to guarantee the availability of anonymized data. According to edge-differential privacy, adding or removing k edges in a graph would change the degrees of 2k nodes. For a query function, for example, the degree distribution, the global sensitivity is 2k. Therefore, for edge-difference privacy, different query functions would have different global sensitivities and perturbation methods. In our degree-differential privacy, the degrees of the nodes are perturbed directly. From the perspective of differential privacy, the security of degree-differential privacy is equivalent to the edge-difference privacy when k = 1. However, in order to preserve the security of publishing a social network offline, we propose a mechanism of generation of edges after perturbing the degrees of nodes. Once the graph is generated, many query functions can be applied. Specifically, the global sensitivity of degree-differential privacy is not relevant to query functions over the social network. Since we have another protection measure for the social network (i.e, graph synthesis), all social connections in the published graph are synthesized. Moreover, as randomness is introduced in synthesizing edges, the security of our approach is better than that of edge-differential privacy. For any node in the original social network, the number of its neighbors may increase or decrease, and the social connections may be real or false in the anonymized social network. Even if a node with a high degree in the anonymized graph is identified by an attacker, the attacker could not further identify the real social ties of the node. Then, further privacy disclosures could be prevented.
Our approach can resist friendship attacks and neighborhood (neighborhood subgraph) attacks. In Table 1 , we summarize the privacy protection method in this paper regarding the resistant attacks, and the strategies to maintain data utility. Since all the social ties are resynthesized, the friendships and the subgraphs are perturbed. Even if a node in the social network has been identified, the attacker is still unable to accurately identify the original social links of the node. Therefore, the solution proposed in this paper can resist friendship attacks and subgraph attacks. In addition, the data utility is guaranteed by the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe extensive experiments to verify that under the same privacy level, the synthetic graph generated by our approach can maintain features of the original social network. We will compare our approach with several other graph generation models over four real social network datasets. Then, we will compare our approach with edge-differential privacy.
A. DATASETS
There are four real social networks in our experiments: Facebook, Ca-HepPh, Ca-AstroPh, Ca-CondMat. They are 
B. METRICS OF EVALUATING DATA UTILITY
The social network will lose information after privacy protection is employed and the information loss would cause the data to be unusable. To evaluate the usability of the synthetic graph, we will introduce several metrics that are usually used in social network analysis applications.
1) DEGREE DISTRIBUTION
The degree distribution is a common feature of a graph that describes the basic structure of a graph and is applied in the similarity comparison between different graphs. To evaluate whether a synthetic graph preserves the degree distribution of the original graph, we will use the Hellinger distance to quantify the distance between the degree distributions of the synthetic graph and the original graph. It is defined as:
where D S and D S represent the degree distributions of the original graph and the synthetic graph respectively. The smaller the Hellinger distance is, the closer the degree distributions are, and the lower the loss of the degree distribution of the synthetic graph.
2) PERCENTAGE OF REAL SOCIAL LINKS
Preserving real social links in the original graph is useful in applications, for example, in friend recommendation. We will compare the percentage of real social links contained in the synthetic graph relative to the original graph for the four models. Suppose the number of edges in an original graph is num, and the number of edges in both the original graph and synthetic graph is num; then, the percentage of real social links preserved in the synthetic graph is num num × 100%.
3) CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT
In graph theory, the clustering coefficient is a measure indicating that nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. In social networks, nodes tend to create tightly knit groups characterized by a relatively high density of ties. This likelihood tends to be greater than the average probability of a tie randomly established between two nodes. There are two categories of the clustering coefficient: the global clustering coefficient and the local clustering coefficient. The global clustering coefficient is based on triplets of nodes. A triplet consists of three nodes that are connected by either two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) undirected ties. Therefore, a triangle includes three closed triplets, one centered on each of the nodes, which means the three triplets in a triangle come from overlapping selections of nodes. The global clustering coefficient is the number of closed triplets (or 3 × triangles) over the total number of triplets (both open and closed). The global clustering coefficient is defined as C(G) = 3×n n w , where n is the number of triangles in a graph G, and n w is the number of connected triplets of vertices in the graph G. A connected triplet is a connected subgraph consisting of three vertices and two edges.
The local clustering coefficient of a vertex in a graph quantifies how close its neighbors are to being a clique. The local clustering coefficient for an undirected graph is defined as follows:
where k i is the number of (v i ). The average of the local clustering coefficients of all the nodes is denoted as C, i.e., C = 1 |V | v i ∈V C i . We will evaluate the mean relative error (MRE) and the mean absolute error (MAE) of C(G) and C in the synthetic graph relative to the original graph in our experiments. The smaller the MRE and MAE are, the better the data usability is.
C. WORKS FOR COMPARISON
There are several graph generation models [20] , [43] - [46] that can synthesize social networks and preserve the degree distribution and clustering coefficient. Among them, the block two-level Erdos-Renyi (BTER) model [43] and the Chung-Lu (CL) model [45] are referenced by many graph analysis works. An efficient implementation of CL called Fast Chung-Lu (FCL) is illustrated in [46] ; therefore, we will compare our FT with FCL instead of CL. TCL extends CL and introduces the concept of the transitive edge in [44] and TCL can preserve the clustering coefficients better. Tri-CycLe, an extension of TCL (transitive Chung-Lu graph FIGURE 1. Hellinger distances over different datasets for four models without differential privacy. models) [44] , can mimic the structural properties that are verified in the literature [20] . To ensure a fair comparison, we will first use degree-differential privacy for the models; then, the graph will be synthesized by the models. For the block two-level Erdos-Renyi (BTER) model [43] , adding or removing an edge could cause significant changes in cluster coefficients, which indicates a high global sensitivity under BTER. However, high global sensitivity could result in preserving less data utility of social networks. Therefore, BTER is not a good choice for differential privacy protection. Thus, we will select FCL [46] (a basic version of TCL), TCL [44] and TriCycLe [20] , rather than BTER as approaches to compare with our approach.
For the comparison with the privacy of previous works, although node-differential privacy and edge-differential privacy can only publish statistical information, such as the degree distribution, they did not describe how to form edges of social networks. The global sensitivity is high for node-differential privacy. Although the methods on reducing the global sensitivity are proposed in the literature [28] , [49] , the global sensitivity is still high. Consequently, we do not need to compare the degree distribution in our method with node-differential privacy. For the edge-differential privacy, we compare our method with the work in [10] in which the noise is added into the degree distribution with noise reduction, whereas our method does not use the method to reduce the noise of the degree distribution.
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will verify that the graph synthesized by our approach can maintain data utility. We will test the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Hellinger distance for the four models over four datasets at different privacy levels. effectiveness of our method from two aspects: (1) correlation between the metrics of social networks and the privacy budget, and (2) adaptability of four models over different social network datasets.
We will first compare the metrics over the graphs synthesized by our method (abbreviated FT) with three graph generation models (FCL, TCL, and TriCycLe) without degree-differential privacy. Then, we first process the datasets with degree-differential privacy and use the four models to synthesize social networks. We compare the metrics on the synthetic graphs perturbed by our method (abbreviated DP-FT) with three graph generation models (DP-FCL, DP-TCL, and DP-TriCycLe) at different privacy levels.
Our experiments are implemented on a win7 computer with 3.60 GHz CPUs and 32 G random access memory (RAM). We implement DP-FT, DP-FCL, DP-TCL, and DP-TriCycLe in Python language. In our experiments, the n in equation (8) is 1, and the number of iterations t in Algorithm 1 is 2.
1) HELLINGER DISTANCE
In this subsection, we first run the four graph generation models(FT, FCL, TCL, and TriCycLe) over four datasets. Then, we run them (DP-FT, DP-FCL, DP-TCL, and DP-TriCycLe) over the four datasets at different privacy levels, and compare the Hellinger distances of the four models.
Hellinger distances without differential privacy The experimental results. The results of Hellinger distances are shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1 , the Hellinger distances for the FT model are the smallest of the four models over the four datasets.
The analysis of results. Since the synthetic graph generated by the field theory model followed the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge, both mechanisms could preserve more features of structures for social networks. Therefore, the Hellinger distances for the FT model are smaller than that of the other three models over the four datasets.
Hellinger distances at different privacy levels The experimental results. The Hellinger distances of four models are shown in Fig. 2(a)-(d) . From Fig. 2(a) -(d) , the Hellinger distances for the DP-FT model are approximately the smallest of the four models over the four datasets. Moreover, when the privacy budget increases, the trend for Hellinger distances for DP-FT is decreasing and exhibits a slight fluctuation. The analysis of the results. From the results in Fig. 2 , the Hellinger distances for DP-FT are decreasing when the privacy budget is increasing. The result is accordant with the Theorem 2. The Hellinger distances are related to the privacy budget for DP-FT. The amount of noise to be added is stochastic and follows a Laplacian distribution. Therefore, there are slight fluctuations in Hellinger distances, as seen in Fig. 2 .
The results of experiments indicate that the Hellinger distances for DP-FT did not substantially decrease the degree distribution over the four datasets.
2) THE PERCENTAGE OF REAL SOCIAL LINKS
In this subsection, we will demonstrate the percentage of real social links retained in synthetic datasets at different privacy levels for the four models.
Real social links without differential privacy The experimental results. The percentages of real social links for the four models are shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 illustrates that the other three models can hardly maintain the real individual links in the synthetic graphs, whereas FT preserves much more of the real individual links.
The analysis of the results. For the results in Fig. 3 , with the exception of FT, there are global random reshuffle operations on social links for the graphs generated in the other three models. Therefore, the synthesized graph generated by the other three models could not preserve more of the real social links. However, FT considers the correlation between nodes during the graph generation and could preserve more of the real social links. 
Real social links at different privacy levels
The experimental results. The percentages of real social links at different privacy levels are shown in Fig. 4 . In Fig. 4(a)-(d) , the percentage of correct social links in synthetic graphs generated by DP-FT increases as the privacy budget ε increases, and the percentages of real social links for DP-FT are the highest over the four datasets. Moreover, for the graph with the high average degree, such as the Facebook dataset, more real social links could be preserved.
The analysis of the results. According to the graph generation process of DP-FT, the probability for sampling an edge is based on the interaction force between two nodes. High degrees of nodes indicate that the nodes tend to cluster together. Therefore, when the correlations between two nodes are larger, the interaction force is larger. Therefore, more real social links are retained.
From the experimental results and analysis above, DP-FT maintains much more of the real social links in synthesized graphs than that of other three models.
3) MRE AND MAE OF CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT
We test the four models over four datasets at different privacy levels. The results for MREs and MAEs for local clustering coefficients are shown in Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7 . The results for MREs and MAEs for the global clustering coefficients are shown in Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10 .
MRE and MAE of Clustering Coefficient without differential privacy
The experimental results. From Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) , the MREs and MAEs of local clustering coefficients for FT are the smallest of the four models over the four datasets. From Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) , the MREs and MAEs of global clustering coefficients for FT are the smallest of the four models over the four datasets.
The analysis of the results. When the differential privacy is not enforced, with the exception of FT, social links between nodes are randomly reshuffled when the graphs are generated in the other three models. However, in FT, we consider the correlation between nodes during the graph generation. Consequently, the local and global clustering coefficients are retained in FT.
MRE and MAE of Clustering Coefficient at different privacy levels
The experimental results. From Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the MREs and MAEs of local clustering coefficients for DP-FT are the smallest of the four models over the four datasets. From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , the MREs and MAEs of global clustering coefficients for DP-FT are the smallest of the four models over the four datasets. In addition, when the privacy budget increases, the MREs and MAEs of local and global clustering coefficients for DP-FT only exhibit a slight fluctuation.
The analysis of the results. During forming a social network randomization is introduced, such that there is a slight fluctuation for the MREs and MAEs of the local and global clustering coefficients. Compared the experimental results at H. Zhu et al.: Differential Privacy Graph Generation With Field Theory for Social Network Data Release FIGURE 11. Comparison of Hellinger distance for DP-FT with edge-differential privacy. different privacy levels with the results without differential privacy, the MREs and MAEs of local and global clustering coefficients are determined by the graph generation process. As in FT we consider the correlation between nodes during the graph generation and adopt the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge, the MREs and MAEs of the local and global clustering coefficients can be retained.
4) COMPARISON WITH THE EDGE-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this subsection, we will compare the Hellinger distance for DP-FT with the edge-differential privacy in [10] because the security of DP-FT is close to the security of edge-differential privacy. The edge-differential privacy in [10] employs noise reduction, while the DP-FT does not. The results are shown in Fig. 11 .
The experimental results. In Fig. 11(a) -(d) , the Hellinger distances for DP-FT are the smaller than that of the edge-differential privacy.
The analysis of the results. From the results in Fig. 11 , the utility of DP-FT is better. The reason is that the generating edges in DP-FT follow the mechanism for preferentially selecting a node and the mechanism for preferentially generating an edge. Thus, the data utility is preserved in our method. From the results, the DP-FT is shown to preserve the utility of the datasets at differential privacy levels.
Summary of the experimental results When ≤ 1, compared with the existing works and the properties of datasets in Table 2 , the metrics of our method are approximate to the smallest over the datasets with high average degree (e.g. Facebook) or the datasets with high clustering coefficient(e.g ca-CondMat), and the data utility is retained in these datasets. Moreover, our method retains most of the real social relations, while maintaining data availability in the Hellinger distance, global clustering coefficient, and local clustering coefficient.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Previous studies on graph anonymization (e.g., [2] - [6] ) are known to be vulnerable to de-anonymous attacks due to strong assumptions on the background knowledge of attackers. For the limitations of these methods, approaches for differential privacy were proposed in the literature [26] , and then differential privacy became an alternative to privacy-preserving social network data releasing. In the following, we will summarize these approaches. Existing works on the differential privacy graph release can be divided into two categories: graph modification and graph generation.
A. GRAPH MODIFICATION APPROACHES
Chen et al. reconstruct a noisy adjacency matrix for a social network by the exponential mechanism after clustering dense regions of the network graph by a data-independent partition process [23] . Although their approach achieves reasonable utility on dense datasets, its data utility relies on the assumption that most edge information must be obtained from the dense regions of the adjacency matrix. Ahmed et al. propose a random matrix method for social networks releasing [24] . This approach uses the random projection technique to reduce the dimension of the adjacency matrix and finally publishes the projected matrix perturbed by differential privacy. However, this method reduced the size of the original social network, and the published data could not be used in data mining and analysis. Thus, the data utility is limited. Our solution is based on the field theory model for graph generation and is not limited by the density of the social networks.
B. GRAPH GENERATION METHODS
Several works in the literature [16] - [20] , [22] focus on generating a synthetic graph by extending a graph model to support the differential privacy. These works are similar to ours. Mir and Wright [16] present edge-differential privacy and estimate the parameters for the original graph; then, they generate a synthesized graph by the classic Kronecker graph model (KGM). Likewise, Li et al. design a differential privacy data release framework based on the Kronecker graph model [22] , in which they use a two-phase privacy budget allocation. Lu and Miklau propose an algorithm estimating the parameters for exponential random graph model (ERGM) [19] , which considers the noise distribution of statistical values after privacy protection so that their method can offer better accuracy than that of parameter estimation based on statistics. However, although ERGM can reproduce the degree distribution and cluster coefficient of an input graph, it is not suitable for processing large-scale social networks. Conversely, KGM is scalable and can process large-scale social networks but fails to preserve the high cluster features in real-world social networks [44] . Compared with these approaches, DP-FT provides a good solution to both scalability and the capture of high cluster characteristics of social networks. Consequently, the data usability of DP-FT is improved.
Sala et al. use the existing dK model as the query function to capture the degree distribution, and proposed a dK-perturbation algorithm to satisfy differential privacy in [17] , which is based on local sensitivity. Nevertheless, the noise magnitude based on the local sensitivity could reveal the distribution of the original data. Subsequent work in [18] combined the dK-graph model and smoothing sensitivity to construct a synthetic graph, but the data utility for many graph mining tasks is still inadequate unless the privacy parameter is unreasonably large (e.g., ≥ 100). Importantly, represents the privacy protected degree, and a smaller indicates more security. Although in practical applications, can be larger than 1, security cannot be guaranteed when is large, for example, > 10. Compared with these methods, the noise magnitude of our work is based on global sensitivity that will not reveal the distribution of the original data. Moreover, we can also obtain high data utility with a small privacy parameter (e.g., ≤ 10).
Proserpio et al. proposed that nonuniformly downweighting the edges in the graph could reduce the high sensitivity of high-degree nodes and developed the data analysis platform named wPINQ. A synthetic graph can be generated by complicated MCMC-based sampling [21] . The distinction between their approach and our method is that they focus on protecting the privacy of the weights; however, our solution is mainly for an unweighted graph.
Xiao et al. estimate the structure of the graph via the privacy edge counting query based on the hierarchical random graph (HRG) model [11] . They reduced the noise of differential privacy by estimating the connection probabilities between nodes. The method of calculating the connection probability is different from the method in this paper. They depend on the lowest common ancestor in a dendrogram T , while DP-FT considers the interaction forces between nodes. However, it is difficult to find a more plausible hierarchy tree T . Jorgensen et al. [20] present a differential privacy adaptation of the attributed graph model (AGM) of Pfeiffer [47] and propose a new structural model, called TriCycLe, to generate a synthetic graph with binary attributes according to parameters calculated by AGM. However, most real social ties are lost in the graph generated by TriCycLe. These works mentioned in [11] , [20] , [45] [11] , [20] , [45] are based on a global shuffle so that many real social links are lost. Moreover, since vertices in their graphs are unlabeled, their approaches, except [11] , do not preserve the utility of the social graph. Compared with these works, our method can maintain the real social links between individuals and the local structure features in social networks.
Qin et al propose a decentralized generation model (LDPGen) for social networks [48] . They consider that the data providers are untrusted during the data collection in social networks. Each user perturbs her data by a randomization method and submits the perturbed data to an untrusted server. Their work is based on the scenario that the servers are untrusted, whereas the method in this paper is based on the centralization scenario.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we propose an approach of degree-differential privacy graph generation with field theory for publishing social networks. The synthetic graph can withstand the attacks with the graph structure as the background knowledge because the interconnection between nodes has been masked. Furthermore, the synthetic graph can maintain data usability similar to existing solutions and retain more real social links. The experimental results on four datasets show that the usability of the published social networks has been maintained. Our solution has more adaptability.
The study in this paper provides a good basis for the solution of privacy problems in social network analysis, but there are still many works worthy of further study. In addition to structure information of social networks, real social networks also contain a substantial amount of attribute information. Endeavoring to meet the goal of maintaining the topological characteristics and the correlations between attributes and edges or attributes relies on designing effective, extensible privacy protection methods to protect sensitive links and attributes. This is challenging work left for future studies.
